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CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM, CITIZENSHIP AND
BELONGING IN AMERICA AND GERMANY
by DAVID ABRAHAM*
In these pages, I address the utility and shortcomings of "constitutional
patriotism"' as a basis for politics of solidarity and redistribution in immigrant
societies. In particular, I want to figure out if an historical-cultural principle may
be added to the abstract and formal-legal demands of constitutionalism. Of course,
the Left has more than once sought to speak for "the nation" as a concrete historical
entity while at the same time holding fast to a universalist, constitutionalist
principle.
2
If "constitutional patriotism" is to mean something more than or different from
"civic nationalism," and if verfassungspatriotismus 3 is to signify more than the
specific legal-political life of the liberal-socialist phase of the German Bonn
Republic, it must offer something more than just resonance with different specific
nation-state histories.4 It must somehow both accommodate and integrate national
histories with a set of capacious liberal and democratic principles.
To begin with, one cannot dismiss the matter of solidarity and collective
identity. Even the hippest pre-9/11 post-nationalists, like Arjun Appadurai, had to
* David Abraham is Professor of Law at the University of Miami, School of Law. He has a B.A.
and Ph.D from the University of Chicago and a J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He works and
has published in the areas of comparative citizenship, labor relations, political economy, legal history,
and social theory.
1. Jargen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States, I EUR. J. PHIL. 128, 132
(1993) ("[Clonstitutional patriotism" refers to the notion that citizenship should rely on a shared sense of
values rather than a common ethnic origin.).
2. On the Left and the nation, there is a long history. See, e.g., JULES MICHELET & JOHN P.
MCKAY, THE PEOPLE (1973); LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2007); JEFFREY N.
HUNT ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND REVOLUTIONS (2000); ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES:
A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991 (1996); ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE
1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY (1992); ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1789-1848
(1964); ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EMPIRE: 1875-1924 (1989).
3. Verfassungspatriotismus is a term for constitutional patriotism coined by Dolf Stemberger in the
late 1970s and made popular by JUrgen Habermas in the late 1980s. Dietmar Schirmer, Closing the
Nation: Nationalism and Statism in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Germany, in THE SHIFTING
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN NATION-STATES 35, 52 (Sima Godfrey & Frank Unger eds., Univ. of
Toronto Press 2004).
4. Jan-Weiner MUller, On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism, 5 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY
278, 285-87 (2006) (MUller concludes that the fact of a specific genealogy cannot discredit the broader
application and availability of Verfassungpatriotismus. This is certainly true. It seems to me, however,
that this conclusion is itself severely undercut by the masterfully sensitive understanding of the Bonn
Republic laid out in the essay.).
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claim that countries were "one node in a post-national network of diasporas. ' '5 In
this posited transnational world, belonging is multiple and variously
institutionalized. Riva Kastoryano claims, for example, that "the country of origin
becomes a source of identity, the country of residence a source of rights, and the
emerging transnational space, a space of political action combining the two or more
countries. ' '6 If these claims are even partly true, we have to ask what or which
solidarity it is that might dare claim legitimately to demand the sacrifice of some
individual and most competing collective identities. Christendom, the Volk,
subjects of His Majesty, the proletariat, the polis, France, people of color, le peuple,
the Constitution, the West are not all equally appealing organizing principles today,
though each of them has been successful in the past.
It may be argued that the very notion of collective identity based on, and
reinforcing solidarity, is itself a fraud, the fruit of successful power and governance
claims by self-interested but hegemonic power blocs. "We, The People," a cultural
community exercising self-government through popular sovereignty, simply may
not exist. Though associated with parts of the Right, the claim that there is no such
thing as society, only individuals (or classes) who (sometimes) choose to subject
themselves to a nexus of contracts that regulate but do not frame their lives, has
also come from parts of the Left.' Not much fellow-feeling, solidarity, or sacrifice
can be expected from mere cohabitation for individual instrumental purposes, even
if that cohabitation takes place under shared legal rules.
Transnational ties, for example, cut across the vertical solidarity of the nation
state and weaken state-society relations. The ascription or conquest of rights and
the assumption of duties require some measure of fraternit6, belonging, or fellow-
feeling. Rights are related to belonging. Certainly each ascending step in the
staircase of rights laid out in T.H. Marshall's classic formulation8 - civil rights to
political rights to social rights - assumes a greater measure of solidarity than the
step below. Civil rights may be granted by even an undemocratic and
unrepresentative sovereign to citizens and subjects alike, political rights mostly
presume some measure of self-governance as well as membership, and social
5. Arjun Appadurai, The Heart of Whiteness, 16.4 CALLALOO 796, 798, 803 (1993) (emphasis
added). Self-described repentant nationalist, avers that, "[wihere soil and place were once the key to the
linkage of territorial affiliation ... key identities and affiliations now only partially revolve around the
realities and images of place." Now "diaspora runs with, and not against, the grain of identity,
movement and reproduction." "Diaspora" seems to be construed now not as an exile from which one
will eventually return but rather as a kind of post-national hybridity, one is tempted to say a
cosmopolitanism for Everyman. The world may look more like this when seen from the platinum elite
frequent-flyer lounge than when seen from the polyglot streets.
6. Riva Kastoryano, Settlement, Transnational Communities and Citizenship, 52 INT'L SOC. SCI. J.
307, 311 (2000) (describing transnational activity in several forms, including a focus on the "home"
country, Europe, and even Islam).
7. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY of JUSTICE 524 (Belknap Press 1971) (claiming that the modem
version of the classical view that human social interdependency and solidarity, facilitated by a state,
were prerequisites for self-fulfillment, or entfaltung, was laid out by Wilhelm von Humboldt in Versuch
die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen (1792)).
8. T.H. MARSHALL & TOM BOT-rOMORE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 42 (Pluto Press 1987).
Although endlessly criticized from nearly every possible perspective, Marshall's paradigm remains at the
center of the discussion.
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rights, in addition, presuppose a willingness to be the keeper of others as a matter
of shared minimum expectation.
Some sense of historical community and shared destiny of citizenship is a
prerequisite for social rights. 9 Those who value social justice must have a place.
This sentiment can be designated in the Mazzinian tradition as "patriotism" (Viroli)
or as being a "cosmopolitan patriot" (Appiah) or, in an older vocabulary, even an
"internationalist."' 0 Perhaps this is all merely "imagined community" talk, a
collective imaginary fit for the era of print capitalism (Anderson)." But perhaps it
is not. The imaginary national identification may actually be a continually
constructed, contested and negotiated, historically contingent, path-dependent
project.
"Popular Front" strategies have attempted to capture shared national
community sentiment on behalf of an agenda of social justice, class, and national
interests. Paul Robeson, for example, captured a good bit of this in his immensely
successful popular-front ballad, "The House I Live In," a song that defined
commonality and shaped it around both abstract principles and concrete
experiences:
What is America to me?
A name, a map, a flag I see
A certain word, 'Democracy.'
The words of old Abe Lincoln,
of Jefferson and Paine
of Washington and Douglass
and the tasks that still remain.
The house I live in,
My neighbors white and black,
The people who just came here
and from generations back
A house that we call 'freedom'
the home of liberty,
But especially the people
9. See MAURIZIO VIROLI, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: AN ESSAY ON PATRIOTISM AND
NATIONALISM (Oxford University Press 1995) (discussing the role of community as an integral role in
social rights); see also Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in COSMOPoLTICS: THINKING
AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 91, 93 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998) (seeking to
connect species-wide community to the actual politics and restraints found on the ground locally). But
"think globally, act locally" is also what Robeson was saying. It was also the message of the socialist
Second International: Workers of the World: "Unite: Go Home and Organize." JAMES JOLL, THE
SECOND INTERNATIONAL (Harper & Row 1966).
10. Id.
11. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMuNrrIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM (2006).
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That's America to me.'
2
Viroli and Appiah may be construed as saying much the same thing, a position
that has also recently been restated by Alexander Aleinikoff:
The idea of belonging is, in important ways, intergenerational.
One is a citizen of an ongoing historical project that looks back to
the settlement of the continent, the creation of the nation, and
seminal events in the past. No matter when their ancestors
arrived in the United States, Americans can claim the Founding
Fathers as their own without a sense of irony.'3
Robeson's words point clearly to a regime of universal (but necessarily
revisable) principles specified through democratic procedures by a particular
political community, one that has a history, which newcomers can and should join
and shape. Newcomers join a work-in-progress, but not one that is arbitrarily or
indeterminately contestable. When Robeson beckons listeners to join at
"Gettysburg and Concord, where Freedom's fight began,"'14 he echoes the principle
that newcomers "too were at Mt. Sinai."'" The particular culture and tradition that
makes "our" constitution ours must be constructed on a foundation of equal liberal
rights for all (liberty), democracy, and a capacious sense of identity. Together
these make "the people," a contingent community of memory and experience
united also by shared attachment to a body of principles. 16 In this view, national
identity becomes a changeable product of collective self-identification.
A nation, as Ernest Renan observed more than a century ago, is a "daily
plebiscite" in which values and consent, "the desire to live together," are repeatedly
adopted or rejected. 7 But as Renan also observed, today's nation "is the
culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacrifice, and devotion" that go beyond
any shared political principles or constitutional patriotism to create an inherited
cultural identity."8 This inherited cultural identity of "endeavors, sacrifice, and
12. PAUL ROBESON, The House I Live In, on SONGS OF FREE MEN (Sony 1997) (1947). Robeson
also sings of battles Lexington, Concord, Gettysburg, and Battan, as well as of farmers, workers, and
neighbors.
13. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE
AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 178 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002) (Aleinikoff observes that such pride and
achievements may produce what John Rawls termed "proper patriotism" and what John Stuart Mill
labeled "common sympathies," presumably real or imagined into reality.) "Proper patriotism" +
common sympathies" + Founding Fathers = Constitutional Patriotism is a possibility.
14. Robeson, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. ERNEST RENAN, What is a Nation?, in NATION AND NARRATION 19 (Homi Bhabha ed., London
1990). Bernard Yack underscores Renan's argument, stating that, alongside the ethnic nation myth of
inherited cultural identity, there is a civic nation myth suggesting that "national identity is nothing but
your choice: you are the political principles you share with other like-minded individuals." Bernard
Yack, The Myth of the Civic Nation, 10 CRITICAL REVIEW 198,203 (1996).
18. Id.
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devotion"' 19 is also, for Renan at least, the history of struggles for sovereignty and
for popular self-determination.
We might usefully view the nation and its citizen members as a product of
four centuries and the concerns that characterized each: the construction of order
and security within a territory, the search for a viable contract of consent among
those present within a territory, the assertion of popular sovereignty and self-rule in
politics and economics by those within the territory, and, most recently, the
struggle between the imperatives of liberty and those of governance. It is as a
product of the particular forms of these experiences that the citizen emerges. Who
is the citizen, the resident of "the house I live in," of the commonality made up of
plurality transcending particularity, as Robeson could have put it?20 The collective,
legally-recognized identity of "citizen" is and always has been unstable and
contested.21 Still, as Max Weber noted already in 1921, citizenship is a constructed
status position that interacts with and mitigates other positions, such as class and
power.22 This is why elites with much power generally attempt to weaken this
status position, and subversive forces interested in organizing and acting on the
basis of class often consider citizenship a false-consciousness, bourgeois-nationalist
patriotism turned against class interest.
23
Citizenship, active social membership, and solidarity generate rights, and
these rights often provide the basis for an assortment of claims. Not so long ago it
seemed uncontroversial that the demand for equal citizenship would turn into a
demand for a different kind of society altogether. 24 Such claims are raised in a
common public realm and profess to be for the collective good. For citizenship to
work, sub-identities or community identities must remain peripheral, or at least
amenable, to overarching ideologies that can encompass all of the citizenry. 25 The
19. Renan, supra note 17, at 19.
20. Robeson, supra note 12.
21. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OFCITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
(Yale Univ. Press 1997) (discussing various notions and definitions of citizenship); JAMES H. KETrNER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1978); MICHAEL
LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION 3-5 (Free Press 1995) (advocating a new universal nationalist
citizenship); Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 256 (1989) (rejecting a new universal nationalist citizenship). Ayelet
Shachar, Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Policy, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS:
MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 386-483 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds.,
Brookings Institution Press 2000) (offering an overview of the concept of citizenship in Israel); see also
ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 21-50 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1992) (discussing the institution of citizenship); FESTSCHRIFT FOR E.W. BOCKENFORDE (R.
Grawert & Bernard Schlink eds., Berlin 1995); KAI HAILBRONNER & GONTHER RENNER,
STAATSANGEHORIGKEITSRECHT(Minchen 1999).
22. MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 221 (Max Rheinstein ed.,
Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1954) (1921).
23. In Europe and America, this sentiment peaked around World War I, and conflicts over what to
do split and destroyed international socialism. The union sacrfe, the Burgfrieden, and their flag-waving
repressive analogue in the U.S. "worked" in this way.
24. REINHARD BENDIX, NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP: STUDIES OF OUR CHANGING SOCIAL
ORDER 86-126 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1964).
25. See Rachel Baskin, Note, Citizenship Theories, Immigration and Nationality Act Section 309 &
Nguyen v. INS: How the Supreme Court Got it Wrong, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 869, 899
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recent weakness of egalitarian ideologies and parties owes at least something to the
rejection of common and equal citizenship.
26
Democracy as a form of life based on active consent and participation has
receded, while citizenship is distributed on the basis of passive criteria of
belonging, territorially or ethnically.27 For the most part, this decline in the civic
republican has been accompanied by a decline in the ethno-national. 2 The civic
fades into the civil while the citizen/alien distinction fades in a way redolent of the
decline of estate, rank, and order. Instead, everyone has rights, and individuals and
groups compete on the basis of them. 29 The outcome of the American liberal legal
transformation of and since the civil-rights era has been, above all, the creation of a
rights culture, which is overwhelmingly universalist and individualist. 30 This marks
(2006) (stating that, although people may view themselves as part of a specific community, "citizens
recognize the political community as instrumental in helping their local communities create a
meaningful collective identity").
26. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive
Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136 (2001) (stating
that the concept of common citizenship is inapplicable in a nation in which "communities of linguistic
minorities are constantly replenished").
27. See Pedro A. Malavet, Outsider Citizenships and Multidimensional Borders: The Power and
Danger of Not Belonging, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 321, 324 (2005) (analyzing differences between legal
and political citizenship and cultural and social citizenship).
28. See Murat Somer, Cascades of Ethnic Polarization: Lessons from Yugoslavia, 573 ANNALS Am.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 127, 135 (2001) (stating that following Tito's death, Yugoslav leaders used
ethnonationalism to attain and consolidate power, which led to the country's destruction).
29. The individualistic and individualizing, apolitical side of rights and of the "rights revolution" in
the United States has been the subject of analysis by conservatives and radicals alike. See, e.g., MARY
ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 47-75 (Free Press
1991) (discussing the image of the lone American possessor of rights); STUART A. SCHEtNGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 59 (2d ed. Univ. of Mich.
Press 2004) (1974) (stating that "the myth of rights is rooted in a moral vision of a political society
dedicated to maximizing individual freedom"); David Abraham, Are Rights the Right Thing?, 25 CONN.
L. REV. 947, 952-65 (1993) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991)); Anthony Chase, The Left on Rights: An Introduction, 62 TEx. L. REV.
1541, 1553-61 (1984) (discussing three categories of Left positions on rights); Morton J. Horwitz,
Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 399-400 (1988) (stating that "natural rights conceptions were
conceived in radical individualism and continue to express an individualistic perspective on social
relations."); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1363-94 (1984) (critiquing rights
discussed in contemporary American legal circles). The situation in Germany is still quite different,
notwithstanding the enlargement of individual rights there over the past thirty years. This will be
addressed below. The individualizing force of right-consciousness has been very visible and important
in Israel over the past decade. See Ran Hirschl, The Great Economic-Juridical Shift: The Legal Arena
and the Transformation of Israel's Economic Order, in THE NEW ISRAEL: PEACEMAKING AND
LIBERALIZATION 189, 193 (Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled eds., Westview Press 2000) (discussing the
"Americanization," characterized by a "culture of rights," that Israel's legal culture has experienced);
Martin Edelman, The Judicialization of Politics in Israel, 15 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 177, 182 (1994)
(stating that by 1974, it had become clear that the "Israeli courts' concern for the rule of law was being
extended to protect human rights"); Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned
Constitutional Reform: Constitutional Politics in Israel, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 592-94 (1996)
(discussing the development of certain individual and human rights in Israel).
30. See David Cole, Are You Now or Have You Ever Been a Member of the ACLU?, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1404, 1410-11 (1992) (discussing how the American Civil Liberties Union changed American
society and how the organization's individualist focus has a universalist force).
[Vol. 16:2
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a substantial departure from the jurisprudence of the Depression, New Deal, and
war years, which was, for the most part, more collectivist and national.3' A similar,
though delayed, story may also be told for Germany and other countries.
Human rights and state sovereignty claims may conflict with each other, but it
is important to remember that the latter may also be a vehicle for such rights. This
relationship has been a problem since the revolutionary "Declaration of the Rights
of Man and Citizen" of 1789.32 Why would the universal rights of man require the
particularism of citizenship? As Hannah Arendt explained it, "abstract" human
beings existed "nowhere." Hence, "The whole question of human rights ... was
quickly and inextricably blended with the question of national emancipation; only
the emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one's own people, seemed to be able
to insure them.
33
A cosmopolitan world society of rational individuals cannot exist in anything
like a democratic world of mass participation. National communities seem
required to support those very rights and freedoms promised to all in the
Declaration and similar documents. Most nation-states today, in fact, justify their
legitimacy on the basis of universalist human rights principles mediated through
their particular history and institutions. As Benhabib has observed, "The tension
between the universalistic scope of the principles that legitimize the social contract
of the modern nation, and the claim of this nation to define itself as a closed
community, plays itself out in the history of the reforms and revolutions of the last
two centuries.
'34
31. This claim is substantial but, on balance, correct. In addition to the Lichtenstein op.cit. and the
sources cited, supra note 21, see ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN
RECESSION AND WAR (Knopf 1995) (discussing the struggle for rights during the New Deal period);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 665 (2d ed. Simon & Schuster 1985) (1973)
(discussing the struggle for rights during the New Deal period); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR:
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 247-332 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (discussing the evolution of American
law through the Great Depression and the New Deal periods). The German and Israeli law systems may
well be following the same trajectory but are much behind. Weimar law and early Israeli law were
certainly more like American collectivism at its peak. See GUnther Frankenberg and Ulrich Rodel, Von
der Volkssouverdnitdit zum Minderheitenschutz (Frankfurt 1981); MENACHEM HOFNUNG, DEMOCRACY,
LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN ISRAEL 76 (Dartmouth Publishing Co. 1996) (describing the system
of civil and political fights in early Israel as one composed of two concentric circles, with the outer
circle consisting of "rights tied to the identity of Israel as a Jewish state"); PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN
JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 91 (Univ. of Cali. Press
1997) ("Collectivism, the subordination of the individual to the public need and the public will, was the
predominant ideology within which self-sacrifice was justified and encouraged.").
32. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZENS (1789), reprinted in THE FRENCH
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN AND THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS, S.
Doc. No. 101-9, at 1-3 (1989) (emphasis added).
33. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 291 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
1966) (1951). On how this citizenship activates and is activated, see William Sewell, Le Citoyen/La
Citoyenne: Activity, Passivity, and the Revolutionary Concept of Citizenship, in THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN POLITICAL CULTURE 105, 105-13 (Colin Lucas ed.,
Pergamon Press 1988).
34. Seyla Benhabib, Citizens, Residents and Aliens in a Changing World: Political Membership in
the Global Era, 66 SOC. RES. 709, 735 (1999).
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One risk, of course, is that nation-states may equate the citizen with the
member of the historic-ethnic nation, thereby collapsing a worthy political and
legal category into an inegalitarian schema of first-class and second-class, more-
and-less citizens by nationality or ethnicity. Here, Arendt's experience as a
refugee, someone made stateless on account of her ethnicity, led her not to turn
against states and toward human rights internationalism but rather to insist that
states be civic polities with citizenship based on legal criteria.35 All those born into
a territorial state had the human right to citizenship in it.36
Universalism and constitutionalism would thus temper the demos. This
position found its way into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15
of which proclaims that everyone has a right to a nationality, something not to be
taken for granted. 37 The development of an international human rights regime has
been pushed forward and earned praise from many quarters, but ordinary citizens,
who might have some voice in a democratic nation-state, are here unrepresented.
38
How closed are these "closed communities" Benhabib refers to, and how do
potentially abstract principles like "civic nationalism" or "constitutional patriotism"
facilitate entry and coherence? In the view of many, the United States is
characterized by a "thin," equal protection model of mostly negative rights
citizenship.39 Civil rights and physical and social mobility are almost all that
autonomous individuals need. Legal equality is about due process and equal
protection for persons. The anti-discrimination model of equal protection is
hegemonic and makes group rights problematic while also impeding the
elaboration of social rights to education, housing, et cetera. The American
immigration regime, in turn, "pays little attention to the thin fabric of social and
political rights that US citizenship entails" and, instead, tries to "create many jobs
and keep them relatively open to international labour. '40 Thus, the American
35. ARENDT, supra note 33, at 290-302 (discussing the loss of rights of stateless people).
36. Id.
37. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (1II), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/8 10, at 74 (1948); Thomas Kleven, Why International Law Favors Emigration over Immigration, 33
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 69, 82 (2002). In September 2002, in the midst of heavy Palestinian-
Israeli violence, the Israeli Interior Minister, claiming to base himself on Clause 1 /B of the Citizenship
Law, moved successfully to strip several native-born Arab Israelis of their citizenship, arguing that they
had left the country to work with its enemies. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel sued, claiming
that it "violated the basic human right to hold citizenship," as well as the Universal Declaration. See
Ha'aretz, Sept. 10, 2002.
38. Compare Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 597-600 (1999),
(championing these organizations as platforms), with RuTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Oxford
University Press 2000) (claiming that most polities cannot internally generate norms as effective and
progressive as those imposed through international claims).
39. See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 329, 390 (1995) (stating that the conception of rights in the United
States is predominantly negative and that government action is viewed as suspect if it burdens rights).
40. Thomas Heller, Change and Convergence: Is American Immigration Still Exceptional?, in
CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL WORLD 196, 197 (Atshushi Kondo ed., Routledge Press 2000). Heller's
emphasis on "exit" and mobility in the U.S. regime - as opposed to "voice" and engagement in the
European regime - is redolent of Sombart's focus on immigration as one reason there was no socialism
in the United States. See also ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
464 [Vol. 16:2
"system" is about large numbers of immigrants, large numbers of available jobs,
easy adjustment between types of visa permissions and statuses, easy transition to
citizenship through naturalization and immediate jus soli birthright citizenship,
poor border control, overburdened administrative apparatuses, negligible
deportation rates, paltry social benefits, and minimal benefit from obtaining
citizenship.
4'
By contrast, German citizenship, like (Jewish) Israeli, is perceived as "thick,"
with sharper exclusions and greater, more explicit social rights and duties. Until
very recently, Germany's entry regime, in turn, was marked by strong border and
internal administrative apparatuses, little likelihood of adjustment between and
among categories of visa permissions, an exceedingly low naturalization rate, no
jus soli birthright citizenship, highly regulated labor markets, a strong system of
available social welfare benefits, and a high salience to citizenship. 42 Where U.S.
citizenship is putatively constitutional and consensual, Germany, like Israel, has
privileged ethno-cultural identity and national belonging within formal
democracy. 43  Indeed, in the Israeli case, Jewish nationality was historically
essential for legal entry into the country and service in its military the chief method
for entrance into its welfare system. In contrast, American citizenship is a lesser
marker, easy to obtain; German and Israeli a greater, more difficult marker to
acquire.
Eroded in numerous ways, from above and from below, the salience of
citizenship seems to be declining, even in Germany, where the process of becoming
a citizen is now much easier. Citizenship is giving way, in the worried view of
many nationalists, to the free market, on the one hand, and group recognition and
calls for ethnic and religious group rights and parochialism, on the other."
a
McWorld confronts Jihad as material global integration confronts ethnic and
DEMOCRACY 128 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1995) (discussing the migration of Europeans to the United
States simply to take jobs).
41. See Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy:
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers, 49
EMORY L.J. 623, 630 (2000) ("The perception of immigrants as a labor source rather than as future
members of our society creates a marginalized subclass of the general population.").
42. Heller, supra note 40, at 196-97, argues that membership came to mean more in Europe
because: population was denser, effective bureaucracies already existed, external threats required a
standing military, states had to compete for loyalty from populations whose identities had been fluid or
local for a long time, mercantilist and imperial traditions had established interventionist government,
and political rights were slow in developing.
43. See Shachar, supra note 21, at 386 (offering interpretations of "ethnic democracy" in Israel);
Yoav Peled, Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 432,
432 (1992) (describing Israeli political culture as comprised of three principles - republicanism,
liberalism and ethnicity); Sammy Smooha, Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the
Arab Minority in Israel, 13 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD. 389, 391 (1990).
44. See Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 208 (2000)
(stating that millions of German residents were born, raised, and are permanently settled there without
having gained German citizenship); David Abraham, After Ethnicity and 'Constitutional Patriotism':
Searching for a Capacious German Membership, in TOWARDS THE COMPLETION OF EUROPE: ANALYSIS
& PERSPECTIVES OF THE NEW EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT 88-100 (Joaquin Roy ed., 2006).
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cultural fragmentation. 45 We have been reminded that there are many things for
which people will die or kill, the nation-state being only one, and hardly the
worst.46 The continued growth in human migration under conditions of a weak
state, or states that choose to act as if they are weak, will accelerate or exacerbate
these tendencies, both benign and ghastly.47 We might therefore worry less about
the construction of the nation and more about citizens' democratic control over the
state, a control that itself requires a measure of solidarity to achieve.
Germany: From Rights to Citizenship
Jus sanguinis, citizenship by blood descent, has sat at the center of German
nationality (staatsangehbrigkeit) and citizenship (btirgerschaft). But it would be
mistaken to conclude that only ethno-nationalism drives German membership.
Through the middle of the nineteenth century, German identities were state-
centered. Indeed, since most German areas were overpopulated, rulers were
content to shed emigrants. On the other hand, the Prussian Emancipation Edict of
1812 granted Jews citizenship without regard to ethnicity and, earlier still, Prussia
had welcomed French Huguenots and Salzburg Protestants.48 As Hegel's 1821
Philosophy of Right49 made clear, the State was the culmination of "ethical life;"
nation or folk was not up to such a task, forget the demos, and the 1842 Prussian
untertanengesetz (law on subjects of the state)50 reflected this view.
It was in 1848, at the Paulskirche5 1 in Frankfurt, that this changed. Into the
middle of that year, the goal of a united and/or liberal Germany included
multinational Austria. The kleindeutsch solution - ethnic and spatial homogeneity
- only triumphed among the democrats and small German radicals in response to
their abandonment and defeat.5 2 The North German Confederation and then, after
45. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VERSUS MCWORLD 4-20 (Corgi Books 2003) (1995)
(describing the clash between Jihad and McWorld); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 215-238 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1984).
46. ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS (1997); MONTESQUIEU, PERSIAN
LETTERS (1964).
47. See Magaly Sanchez R., Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America,
606 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 178, 191-92 (2006) (exploring how violence can cause
migration, which, in turn, can cause more violence).
48. See Gerhard Robbers, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion
or Belief in Germany, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 841, 869-71 (2005) (discussing the range of religious
freedom in Germany).
49. GEORG HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (S.W. Dyde trans., George Bell & Sons 1896).
50. See Klaus J. Bade, Immigration, Naturalization, and Ethno-National Traditions in Germany, in
CROSSING BOUNDARIES: THE EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION OF MINORITIES IN GERMANY AND AMERICA
29, 32 (Larry Eugene Jones ed., Berghahn Books 2001) ("The corresponding regulations of the Prussian
Subjects' Law became part of the regulations for the whole Reich in 1871 and formed the basis of the
Reich Citizenship Law of 1913.").
51. The Paulskirche (Saint Paul's Church) in Frankfurt is where Germany's National Assembly met
in 1848 to draft a new constitution. Bernd J. Hartmann, How American Ideas Traveled. Comparative
Constitutional Law at Germany's National Assembly in 1848-1849, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 23, 24
(2002).
52. For classic discussions of these developments, see THEODORE S. HAMEROW, RESTORATION,
REVOLUTION, REACTION: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN GERMANY 1815-1871, at 95-196 (Princeton
TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:2
CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM
1870, the German Empire, adopted the territory-based rule of citizenship. 3 It was
only after the rightward turn of German Conservatives trying to catch up with right-
wing populism after 1895 that "blood" became a key concept in German
citizenship. 54 In this atmosphere, the 1913 Reichs und Staatsangehirigkeitsgesetz
finally went ethnic.
Nationality as a 'national bond' between the German Empire and
Germans living abroad was confirmed and no longer dissolved even
when the period of residence abroad was long-term. To ensure state
control at all times over the naturalisation of immigrant workers, the
principle of descent was reasserted against territorialism with the law
confirming a basic ethnic-cultural notion of citizenship as a national
community of descent .... 5
The loss of German territories and populations after 1919 and 1945 made
revision of the 1913 principles difficult because revision would have meant
renouncing rather large territorial claims and accepting large population losses.56
Efforts by Social Democrats and others during the Weimar Republic to reintroduce
jus soli principles into citizenship law failed, in part because efforts to democratize
the country generally were stymied by reaction.57 Friedrich Meinecke's widely
Univ. Press 1958); HANS KOHN, PRELUDE TO NATION-STATES: THE FRENCH AND GERMAN
EXPERIENCE, 1789-1815, at 119-79 (D. Van Nostrand Company 1967); LEONARD KRIEGER, THE
GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: HISTORY OF A POLITICAL TRADITION 273-397 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1972) (1957). For a discussion of the recent baseline see ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND
NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (Harvard Univ. Press 1992).
53. See Dieter Gosewinkel, Citizenship and Naturalization Politics in Germany in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries, in CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP 59, 61-62 (Daniel Levy & Yfaat Weiss
eds., Berghahn Books 2002) (discussing citizenship in the developing German nation-state).
54. See P.G.J. PULZER, THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 118-26,
226 (Norman F. Cantor ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1964) (discussing the changing political position of
the Conservative Party at the end of the nineteenth century); JACK WERTHEIMER, UNWELCOME
STRANGERS: EAST EUROPEAN JEWS IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 54-60 (Jehuda Reinharz ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1987) (discussing the increasingly strict naturalization policies in the late nineteenth century).
55. Dieter Gosewinkel, "Citizenship and Naturalization in Modem German and Austrian History,"
ms. July 2001, p. 3. Elsewhere Gosewinkel stresses that the ethno-nationalist victory of 1913 was a
narrow one and hardly irreversible. Gosewinkel, supra note 53, at 59; see also DIETER GOSEWINKEL,
EINBORGERN UND AUSSCHLIEBEN: DIE NATIONALISIERUNG DER STAATSANGEHORIGKEIT 278-368
(Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2001).
56. See Jochen Oltmer, Migration and Public Policy in Germany, 1918-1939, in CROSSING
BOUNDARIES: THE EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION OF MINORITIES IN GERMANY AND AMERICA 50, 51-52
(Larry Eugene Jones ed., Berghahn Books 2001) (discussing the increase in German emigration after
World War I).
57. On immigration reform efforts in the Weimar years, see Klaus J. Bade, Immigration,
Naturalization, and Ethno-National Traditions in Germany, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: THE
EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION OF MINORITIES IN GERMANY AND AMERICA 29 (Larry Eugene Jones ed.,
Berghahn Books 2001); Jochen Oltmer, Migration and Public Policy in Germany, 1918-1939, in
CROSSING BOUNDARIES: THE EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION OF MINORITIES IN GERMANY AND AMERICA
50 (Larry Eugene Jones ed., Berghahn Books 2001).
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propagated post-war view of Germans as tied together by culture was as partial and
distorted as his pre-war view that Germans were made by blood and tribe.58
After 1945, with the country both divided and flooded with refugees from
territories no longer under its control, the 1913 principles were reinstalled with only
the Nazi exclusion and racial ejection principles stripped away. 59 In addition, of
course, the Basic Law of 1949 required Bonn to look after the interests of both
halves of the country - the "two German states" view emerging only very late in
the going.6°
As a result, and despite the rapid growth of the foreigner population, until
2000, a child acquired German citizenship by descent from a German parent (Art
4). Naturalization was contemplated in the law, but as a rarity. With ten years of
problem-free residence in the country, a foreigner could apply for a discretionary
(that is, not of right) grant of naturalization. Renunciation of other loyalties was
essential, but more importantly, applicants had to show a "turn to Germanness"
(hinwendung zum deutschtum), including language proficiency and declared
constitutional loyalty.6' A mutual lack of interest led to an average of only 15,000
naturalizations annually between 1974 and 1989. With the removal of "discretion"
in 1984 the number climbed to 35,000 in 1985 and, by 1997, had reached 80,000,
so that, by 2000, over one million people had naturalized as German in the
bundesrepublik.
While German citizenship law evolved only slowly from its ethnic premises,
there developed alongside it, or juxtaposed to it, the theory of abstract, universalist
popular sovereignty that came to be "constitutional patriotism." Especially after
the post-1968 reforms (and not withstanding moments of regression such as
verfassungsfeindlichkeit, berufsverbot and the like), the integument of West
German society came to be something civic, voluntary, non-biological, and a
matter of communicative reciprocity.6 Constitutional or civic patriotism makes of
national belonging a form of rational attachment that is compatible with liberal
commitments to individual rights as well as with social commitments to equality.
63
58. See FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE NATIONAL STATE 9 (Princeton Univ.
Press trans., 1970) (1963) (offering a 1928 pre-war view); see also FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, THE GERMAN
CATASTROPHE (Sidney B. Fay trans., Beacon Press 1966) (for a 1955 post-war view); see also RALF
DAHRENDORF, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY 5, 21 (Doubleday & Company 1967) (1965)
(discussing the German Question); HAROLD JAMES, A GERMAN IDENTITY: 1770-1990, at 3 (Routledge,
Chapman, and Hall, Inc. 1989) (discussing the interaction of culture and economy).
59. Gosewinkel, supra note 53, at 59, 70-73 (discussing the Citizenship Law of 1913 and the
German Basic Law of 1949).
60. AXEL TSCHENTSCHER, THE BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ): THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (MAY 23, 1949) (Jurisprudentia Verlag 2002), available at
http://www.jurisprudentia.de/jurisprudentia.html.
61. Most of the data here is drawn from the bundesinnenministerium, POLICY AND LAW
CONCERNING FOREIGNERS, (Berlin 2000) and Rainer Mijnz, Ethnos or Demos? Migration and
Citizenship in Germany, in CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP 15, 19, 25 (Daniel Levy & Yfaat Weiss
eds., Berghahn Books 2002).
62. See Dietmar Schirmer, Closing the Nation: Nationalism and Statism in Nineteenth- and
Twentieth-Century Germany, in THE SHIFTING FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN NATION-STATES 35, 52




The Constitution is, in Germany after all, a liberal democratic and social
democratic commitment. 64
Verfassungspatriotismus reached its apogee in the Germany of the pre- and
early-post-unification years. 65 Sometime in the '90s, however, it came to appear
ahistorical, procedural, formalistic, and cold. 66  The civic is necessary but not
sufficient. Even constitutionalism can become more substantive, embedded,
thicker, and exclusionary.67  And even civic national identities are culturally
inherited artifacts, developing as they pass from generation to generation. They
belong to some people but must be learned by others, even if only through a
process of "naturalization" or "einbUrgerung" (the effectiveness of which we might
be able to test).
68
For Germany, but not only for Germany, national belonging is more than
rational attachment; it encompasses "the contingent inheritance of distinctive
experiences and cultural memories that is an inseparable part" of every national
identity.69 As admirable as constitutional patriotism is as a theory for organizing a
polity, national belonging needs - and assumes - more. It assumes some
measure of shared prepolitical community arching over any agreement on legal-
procedural rules and making a nation more than a political community organized
around voluntary association.
The shortcomings of constitutional patriotism as a social integument were
papered over by the strength of the German welfare state economy and its treatment
of denizens and have since been laid bare in the course of immigration reform.
70
64. AXEL TSCHENTSCHER, THE BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ): THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (MAY 23, 1949) (Jurisprudentia Verlag 2002), available at
http://www.jurisprudentia.de/jurisprudentia.html.
65. Schirmer, supra note 62, at 35, 52 (discussing constitutional patriotism).
66. Id.
67. Habermas developed the concept of constitutional patriotism over a number of years. See
JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW
AND DEMOCRACY 491-515, 566-67 (William Rehg trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. Press 1996) (1992)
(offering a full statement regarding constitutional patriotism). By the end of the '90s, Habermas became
aware that even constitutional procedural principles required some historical, cultural embeddedness.
This is a difficult adjustment to make since historically embedded cultures belong to some yet must be
learned by others; they are not as contractual as constitutional and procedural agreements. See JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER 105-54 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., Mass. Inst.
of Tech. Press 1998) (1996) (discussing the European Nation-State and the relation between the nation,
law, and democracy).
68. It is, as they used to say, "not an accident" that in both Germany and the U.S. today there is a
great deal of concern over testing the competence or fidelity of those going through a naturalization or
Einburgerung. These tests are about both the Constitution and cultural Landschaft.
69. Bernard Yack, The Myth of the Civic Nation, 10 CRITICAL REVIEW 193, 197 (Spring 1996). Cf.
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (New York
1993). As Yack notes, it is hard to understand German reunification, as opposed to the democratization
of East Germany, along Habermas's lines. Popular sovereignty is, Yack insists, more than "consensus
achieved in the course of argument ... from an identically applied procedure recognized by all." Id. at
201 (quoting Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 259 (Ronald
Beiner, ed. 1995)).
70. MUller, 5 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 4. In his fine essay, MUller
describes verfassungspatriotismus as the foundation of West Germany's legitimacy. One might argue
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Millions came from abroad to work in the Germany of the Economic Miracle. 7' By
the time recruitment was stopped in 1973, there were four million foreigners in
West Germany.72 Family unification and formation could be made difficult, but not
stopped, so the numbers continued to grow, 73 and life without citizenship was not
life without rights or without solidarities. In 2000, there were approximately 7.5
million foreigners living in Germany, or nearly ten percent of the population - of
these, nearly 1.5 million, or 20 percent, was born in Germany.7 4 In fact, a third of
all foreigners have been in Germany for over twenty years; forty percent for over
fifteen years, and half for over ten years.7 5 About thirty percent of foreigners are
Turkish, fifteen percent Yugoslav, and twenty-four percent EU, with a third of that
being Italian.
76
Long-term foreign residents, denizens, have enjoyed the same labor market
preferences as Germans and the same social benefits as well.7 7 Given much higher
union density than in the United States and a more centralized bargaining regime,
as well as tougher government enforcement of labor standards, the disparities
between domestic and foreign workers are less than in the United States, though
real. 78 Indirect wages are high by American standards, just as they are for native
workers: child benefits, health insurance, school and job education allotments, long
vacations, pensions, et cetera.79  Shopkeepers and other petit bourgeois and
business people are eligible for and protected by the same programs as the
famously security-obsessed Kleinbiirgertum.8° As to civil and political rights, the
that, until the 1980's at least, the Economic Miracle, front-line anti-communism, and philo-Americanism
were the pillars on which West Germany rested.
71. German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Labor Recruitment, http://www.zuwanderung.de/
english/I anwerbung.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) (stating that the domestic labor supply was
insufficient and that, therefore, West Germany signed recruitment agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece,
Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia).
72. German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Immigration Statistics, http://www.zuwanderung.de
english/lstatistik.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) (stating that the number of foreigners living in West
Germany by 1973 had risen to around 4 million).
73. Id. (stating that, from 1973 to 1985, most immigration to Germany was due to family members
joining foreigners already located in Germany and that, by 1985, the number of foreigners in the country
had increased to 4.4 million).
74. German Embassy, London, http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/foreign.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2007) (indicating that 7,296,817 foreigners were located in Germany as of December 2000).
75. German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Immigration to Germany, http://www.zuwanderung.de/
english/migrationjto-germany.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
76. Id.
77. THOMAS FAIST, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP FOR WHOM?: YOUNG TURKS IN GERMANY AND MEXICAN
AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (Ashgate Publishing Co. 1995).
78. See Rudolph Buschman, Workers Participation and Collective Bargaining in Germany, 15
COMP. LAB. L.J. 26, 26-27 (1993) (discussing how trade unions in Germany are constituted freely and
how the Federal Labor Court has stated that collective bargaining without the right to strike is "nothing
more than collective begging").
79. See Marc Linder & Ingrid Nygaard, Rest in the Rest of the World, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
105, 120 (1998) (stating that German workers have gained a shorter workweek and much longer
vacations than workers in the United States).
80. Holger Hoffmann, The Reform of the Law on Citizenship in Germany: Political Aims, Legal
Concepts & Provisional Results, 6 EUR. J. OF MIGRATION & L. 195 (2004); ELI NATHANS, THE
POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY: ETHNICITY, UTILITY & NATIONALISM (2004).
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picture resembles that of the United States: on non-immigration issues, foreigners
enjoy the same civil liberties as Germans; with rare exceptions, non-EU foreigners
may not vote or occupy upper-level civil service or political offices.8
With security of residence, moderate family unification rights, social rights,
civil liberties, and a high standard of living, why take the extra step of becoming
German? Why risk losing benefits and rights in your country of origin - as is
often the case - in order to become part of a people who seem ambivalent about
having you? For one thing, Germany is now home to many, and the new
Nationality Act finally recognizes that:
Children born in Germany to foreigners living here permanently are
to be given the chance to grow up in Germany as German nationals
from the outset. . . . The acquisition of nationality marks the
beginning of social integration. If children born in Germany go to
nursery school here and receive all their schooling and vocational
training in a German environment and already grow up in the
awareness of being Germans with all the rights and obligations this
entails, they will develop important bonds and feelings of
identification with Germany and the German way of life.
82
An amended, Foreigners Act (§ 85) also now allows for naturalization after
eight years subject only to a sufficient command of the German language and
acknowledgment of the Basic Law.83  The new Immigration Laws
(Zuwanderungsgesetz) of 2003 and 2004 are not at all clear on this matter.
84
What has been striking, particularly in the last several years, is the emphasis
on foreigners "integrating," something "both sides" must "want. '85 Less clear is
whether foreigners are being invited -to join an ongoing German project as it
currently exists or to join Germans in charting a future course for themselves as
"equal partners" in something new - the difference is important. Nevertheless, an
emerging consensus situates "nationhood in distinctively non[-]ethnic terms
81. See Kay Hailbronner, Fifty Years of the Basic Law - Migration, Citizenship, and Asylum, 53
SMU L. REV. 519, 527 (2000) (discussing the Constitutional Court's decision striking down as
unconstitutional a law that granted foreigners in Hamburg the right to vote).
82. Now, furthermore, "all those wishing to identify with . . . Germany as a democratic and
constitutional state are welcome as citizens with equal rights." Bundesministerium op cit., p. 54.
Section 4, 3 of the new Nationality Law stipulates that children born in Germany to a parent who has
had an unlimited residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis) for at least three years or residence right
(Berechtigung) for eight years will acquire German citizenship at birth. If they also acquire another
nationality, they will need to choose between the two upon reaching majority.
83. See Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Belonging: Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and
in Germany, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 330, 377-78 (2006) (stating that citizenship is available through
naturalization if the applicant has lawfully resided in Germany for eight years and satisfies other
statutory criteria).
84. German Federal Ministry of the Interior, The Immigration Act, http://www.zuwanderung.de/
english/2_zuwanderungsgesetz.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
85. See Anne Marie Seibel, Deutschland ist doch ein Einwanderungsland geworden: Proposals to
Address Germany's Status as a "Land of Immigration", 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 905, 932 (1997)
(suggesting proposals to address the need to integrate the foreign resident population).
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revolving around social norms" so that non-ethnic criteria at least complement
descent.8 6 The German Basic Law, the fount of constitutional patriotism,
anticipates and facilitates a strong welfare state. Social minima and social
consumption require social consensus and solidarity.87 The distributive logic is one
of closure, not of market-style openness.88 Citizens and resident foreigners must be
inside the same closed system.89 The welfare state "seeks to take care of its own;"
it is "a kind of safe house in which to shelter its members from the outside world"
so that they may be immune from competitive disadvantages and capital flight.90
The segmentation of labor markets must be avoided.
In the face of an eroding welfare state, it becomes more important to integrate
"foreigners" fully into solidaristic social life. Failure to integrate at this point is an
invitation to reaction 91 among both natives and foreigners. It is unclear whether
constitutional patriotism is up to that task. A much more individualized, neo-
liberal, "thinner" society may be in a better position to pursue integration around
civic-constitutional and cultural principles than the thicker social vision that was
also a part of constitutional patriotism in its heyday. This understanding has
recently, and very interestingly, led the German Left away from multiculturalism
and toward "mainstreaming. ' '92 A House to live in.
86. DANIEL LEVY, The Transformation of Germany's Ethno-Cultural Idiom, in CHALLENGING
ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP 221, 230 (Daniel Levy & Yfaat Weiss eds., Berghahn Books 2002) (documenting
both elite and popular sentiment).
87. David Abraham, Citizenship Solidarity and Rights Individualism: On the Decline of National
Citizenship in the U.S., Germany, and Israel 32 (The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies,
Working Paper 53, May 2002), available at http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/publications/wrkg53.PDF (stating
that "[slocial minima and social consumption require social consensus and solidarity.").
88. Donald Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837 (1991);
David Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
89. Gary B. Freeman, Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State, 485 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 51, 54 (May 1986) (exploring the consequences of transnational flows of labor
both for the status of migrants who move to welfare states and for the viability of welfare states
themselves).
90. Id.
91. Id. (stating that "[w]idespread immigration has reduced the power of organized labor by
dividing the working class into national and immigrant camps, by easing tight labor market[s] ... and by
provoking a resurgence of right-wing and nativist political movements .... By making racially diverse
societies . . . migration has complicated social and political cleavages . . . [and] helped shift the
ideological center of European politics to the right.").
92. See Migration und Bevblkerung 7 (Sept. 2002), p. 6; Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Thomas Schmid,
Heimat Babylon: Dos Wagnis der multikulturellen Demokratie (1992) (praising multiculturalism); Claus
Leggewie, MultiKulti: Sprachregeln fir die Vielvolkerrepublic (1992) (praising multiculturalism).
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